

THE EVOLUTION OF THE POST-COMMUNIST BULGARIAN PARTY SYSTEM

Antony Todorov

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Party differentiation in Bulgaria and the other East-European states after communism has already been subject to sufficiently extensive analysis. There also exist explanatory paradigms of the process of party formation. Herbert Kitschelt views the process as a progression through three consecutive stages of party organization: around a charismatic leader, on a client-patron type of basis, and finally - the emergence of a program-based party. He sees the success of the political transition largely as a chance for establishment of party differentiation among program parties (ideally, since empirically each party is a symbiosis of charisma, clientage, and program elements). This process is also a progression from an unstable to a stabilized democracy and regarding political parties implies a high degree of party distinctness and not so pronounced individual characteristics. (Kitschelt 1995) On the contrary, in the early stages of the process, parties are typically poorly distinguished in terms of their programs, but have salient characteristic features, largely related to their genealogy. In the beginning they therefore experience a strong need for legitimization in the political space.

Michael Waller notes the fact that new parties do not have clear-cut roles. They therefore need symbolic identification with universally accepted political models, such as the European model to Bulgaria. Thus the newly created (transformed or restored) political parties in Bulgaria simultaneously legitimize themselves through a European model (prove to be its outcome), and introduce the European model (prove to be its factor) in political life. (Waller and Myand, 1994)

This text will discuss the evolution of the party system in Bulgaria during the political transition after the fall of the communist regime in 1989. The main hypothesis is that there is a general trend of the evolution, leading from one Manichean pattern of opposition between anti-communists and ex-communists to European model of political pluralism. The party system of the post-communist Bulgaria was shaped by internal and external impacts. On the one hand the political development in Bulgaria during the transition was influenced by the European Union and especially by the European parties and their will to find respective partners in Bulgaria. This pressed political actors in the country to operate changes both on ideological and organisational level in order to meet the expectation of the potential European partners. On the other hand the diversification and the consolidation of the political actors after the re-establishment of the political pluralism in Bulgaria followed the more or less accepted and seen as reference left-centre-right scale. This conducted to the appearance, or better, to the self-identification of the main parties in conformity with this scale, so that at the end of the political transition the main political roles, according to this spectrum, were played at least by one political party.

The period of the emergence, establishment, growth and consolidation of the post-communist party system in Bulgaria can be seen as a succession of four different periods, which differ each from other by their main political actors, the substance of the political debate, the dominant political style and, of course, the most important national goals to be achieved. The first period, which is in fact the last stage of the communist regime, begins with the soviet perestroika in 1985 and ends with the dismissing of Zhivkov, the last communist ruler. This period is characterized by the limited diversification of the political debate and the growth of the dissident movements like Ekoglasnost and the Club for glasnost and perestroika. The second stage of the evolution begins with the political change on the top of the communist party in 1989 and lasts to the end of 1996. Even though during these seven years many politically different governments and parliamentary majorities rotated (1 constitutional election and 2 parliamentary elections, two presidential elections and 5 prime ministers), this was the time of the obvious hegemony (in Gramscian sense) of the "conservative left" – the dominant group within the Bulgarian socialist party, trying to combine some neo-communist and socialist ideas with the orientation to the statu quo and tending to avoid radical break with the communist past. On the other side, during this period, the anti-communist "revolutionary right" crystallizes and consolidates as an opposition of the BSP – the eclectic and heterogeneous Union of the democ-

ratic forces (UDF). The third stage of the evolution begins with the electoral victory of the UDF in November 1996 presidential elections and ends with the emergence of the liberal centre – the newly established National Movement Simeon II (NMSII) in 2001-2002. This period is a real breaking of the mould because it ends the long lasting bi-polar structure of the political debate, opposing anti-communists and ex-communists. The last, present, stage of the evolution of the party system begins in 2002 with the split up of the right and the westernization of the BSP (former communist) and ends with the parliamentary elections of 2005 and the creation of the coalition government between socialists, MRF and NDSII. This last period is marked also by the appearance of the extreme right xenophobe party “Ataka” in 2005.

1. Debut: anti-communists against ex-communists.

The present party system cannot be understood without having in view the specificities of the communist regime and especially **the role of the ruling Communist party**. By its origins it is a party in the western sense of the term – a hierarchical organisation with strongly arranged membership and many non-partisan organisations around, having the main task to promote the party’s strategy within the society. But in fact the Communist party within the communist regime is quite another political body, a kind of power structure which substitutes the state or, more precisely, worked in a parallel way, controlling every level of the state political power. The real government in the communist regime was the Politburo – the head of the communist party, which was selected / elected within a multilevel structure of internal elections and designations, more or less controlled by the ruling group. In this system the party members were not as it is in western parties individuals having chosen the party ideas and strategy and having accepted to become formal members. The members of the ruling communist party, who during the last years of the communist regime in Bulgaria counted more than 1 million, in fact were more or less invited to join the party. And this act shows that their role was not the role of active party agents, but just electors, with real electoral franchise, allowing them to participate in the process of selection of Politburo through a complex system of basic-local-national intra-party selection of the leaders. If we understand the members of the ruling communist party as real electoral body, as enfranchised citizens in the era of the universal suffrage (in communist Bulgaria after 1945 the suffrage was universal, for both genders and for citizens over 18 years of age), we can easily understand why the communist party lost almost two third of its members during the first months of the democratic transition.¹

But the communist party in rule, being the only one effective political actor (the second party, the Bulgarian agrarian national union – BANU, had just a supplementary position and never played important role), was the field of the real political process. Within the party structures there were political conflicts and arrangements between structured groups, clans, informal circles etc. The ruling party, as well as its surrounding of other official organizations (like the Communist youth, the Fatherland front) were the domain for the acquirement of political experience by the elites, which would play important role after the fall of the regime.

The most important trend in the beginning of the democratization after 1989 was **the emergence of the party pluralism**. There were three main way of “party construction”:

- a) “Partization” of the dissident groups in the eve of the regime change, transformation of these opposition civic organizations into parties (the Green party, Ekoglasnost, the Clubs for democracy).
- b) Restoration of historic parties, forbidden in 1947-1948 by the communist government or having existed before the World War 2.
- c) Splits within the former communist party, or processes of changing the party’s political profile in a democratic environment (the Alternative socialist party or the internal party referendum which changed the name into Bulgarian socialist party – BSP).

¹ There are many studies on communist regime and on the nature of the post-communist transition in Bulgaria, but among them I will note those, which especially discuss the role of the CP: Ognianov 2006; Baeva and Kalinova 2001; Vigreux and Wolikow 2003; Kornai 1992; Dahrendorf 1990; Dreyfus & al. 1997; Courtois 1997.

This was not Bulgarian particularity and happened in almost every other post-communist country in Central-Eastern Europe. During the first years of the transition the main political debate was between the anti-communist movements and parties on one hand, and the former communist party or what began to be called “the successor party”. It is interesting to see that analysts quickly used the term of “post-communists” or “former communists” for these parties, which took the most important part of the members and of the symbolic capital of the former ruling Communist parties. No special attention was paid to parties, which appeared after 1989 claiming to be heirs of the communism in these countries and taking officially the name of “communist” (post-communist communism). In front of these “successor parties” (the BSP in Bulgaria) was organized often a coalition of different and autonomous political parties – the Union of the democratic forces in Bulgaria, established in December 1989 by 13 opposition organizations. The debate between anti-communists and ex-communists was a dominant structure in the beginning of the transition, which is not surprising. This was the main axis of political confrontation, which concentrated other debates: between new and old, renovation and statu quo; about what to be left and what to be kept from the communism, what kind of reforms – fast or slow to choose. Behind these debates there was a symbolic fight for legitimacy for both parts of the confrontation, but especially for the former communists. This main debate put into the centre the problem of the communism – should it be totally or only partially banned, should it be partially accepted for its social state, or not at all, should it be partially approved for its ideological goals or rejected for its political practices? (cf. Crampton 1993)

At the beginning of the transition in Bulgaria, like in other Central-East European countries, one can see the confrontation never encountered in western countries: between one “conservative left” (former communists) and one “revolutionary right” (anti-communists). So, many western political actors were really in difficulty to identify easily their political counterparts. (cf. Todorov 1997) The BSP was the “party of the statu quo” claiming the preservation of the order, the slow and reasonable reform, the maintenance of the communist legacy. The party claimed an ideology, which has been adopted during the short period of the soviet perestroika, having deep impact on the Bulgarian society (a version of reformed socialism). The Union of the democratic forces (UDF) was a very large coalition of organizations, which covered the whole western political palette: from the social-democratic left, through the liberal centre to the conservative right. The coalition was very heterogeneous and the only one common ideology was the anti-communism.

2. Mittelspiel: the bi-polar pattern.

Once the party pluralism restored (in Bulgaria the pluralism during the decade before communism was quite authoritarian and superficial), the political process was marked by two parallel evolutions. **On the left side**, the BSP performed a shift from a kind of post-Stalinist party, shaken by the soviet perestroika in 1985-1989, having lost two thirds of its members in 1990 after the adoption of the new name, towards a “modern left party”, nor communist, neither social-democratic. The party tried to keep its potential voters (2.8 million in 1990, which was almost 45% of the whole electorate) with a programme of “velvet reforms” and avoiding radical bound in the transition. It operated a moderate westernization and attempts to adopt some principles of the western social-democracy. The BSP was not already a power structure, but became step by step a militant party, oriented to elections. For many ex-communist members, who were fired from their employment, it represented a kind of protection structure during its opposition period (1991-1992). Instead of disappearing, the BSP, a successor party, took new opportunities for its implantation in the Bulgarian society. The party assured the promotion of new elite, who replaced the old guard through often severe internal debates. The chosen formula of “modern left party” disappointed both social-democratic intellectuals and neo-communists, who left the BSP after 1993-1994. But the party remained in this intermediate position until the deep economic and political crisis of 1996-1997, which led to the fall of the BSP government and put the party in opposition for almost eight years.²

The social-democratic international legitimacy is probably of greatest importance to BSP. BSP proclaimed itself the successor to the social democracy of 1891, but likewise, to the Communist Party of 1919. Since it changed its name in April 1990, it has been seeking its legitimacy

² Cf. the text of Dobrin Kanev in De Waele 2002.

primarily as a party of the social democrats in Bulgaria. Clearly, BSP - the inheritor of the former communists - can legitimize itself as a new democratic party which has broken with the past mainly by enlisting the support of international social democracy.

In its quest for international legitimacy BSP is facing numerous obstacles. Most notably, the Socialist International already had a Bulgarian member – BSDP. Thus, through all the years of transition BSP has constantly been striving to produce evidence of its social-democratic nature and to cooperate with BSDP, after the main part of it left UDF in 1991. The second challenge on BSP's road to social democracy was the Bulgarian Euroleft, created in 1997. Arising as a result of the severe political crisis of January 1997, upon its very appearance the Euroleft declared its aspirations to legitimize itself as the Bulgarian social democracy. This was a hard blow for BSP, related, among other things, to the passing over to the new formation of a number of its leaders who had up to then been involved in maintaining the party's international contacts with the Socialist International and the Party of European Socialists (PES).

In 1992 BSP filed an official application for SI membership and the process gained speed over the next two years, when a series of visits took place upon the invitation of influential social-democratic parties (Germany, Belgium, France, and Greece). In December 1994 BSP received a "standing invitation" to the SI. After the crisis of 1996-97 relations were frozen as a result of the disappointment of international social democracy at the failure of BSP's government. Politically isolated after 1997, the BSP changed its leadership and undertook a deep transformation into social-democratic party, accepting the Bulgaria's accession to NATO.

On the right part of the political spectrum the processes were not less dynamic. The main trend was the transformation of the large anti-communist heterogeneous coalition of autonomous parties into one party, with neo-liberal, anti-communist and rightist political profile. UDF arose as a coalition of non-communist parties and organizations. By origin UDF is defined as an anti-communist party. Already at the dawn of the new political pluralism in Bulgaria, UDF self-defined itself ideologically and politically as the antipode to the communist party, to BSP. The central slogan of the coalition during the first elections in 1990-1992, "Totalitarianism or Democracy", indicated UDF's aspiration to represent the entire political palette of the emulated Western democracy, which excluded any remnants of communism, even the reforming Communist Party. On the other hand, in the beginning UDF was a broad coalition of parties and organizations of different ideological orientation. The coalition was initially characterized by the coexistence of left-wing and left-centrist parties (social democrats, agrarians), right-wing and conservative parties (democrats and monarchists), liberal parties, Greens, ecologists, etc.

In May 1991 social-democrats split up on the occasion of the adoption of the new constitution and the attitude towards the group of 39 UDF deputies who had declared a hunger strike against the passing of the constitution. With the withdrawal of Petar Dertliev, the social-democratic component in UDF was considerably reduced, not only by share, but likewise by relative political weight. At the same time UDF was left by an influential group from Ekoglasnost, who could ideologically be assigned to the left-wing ecologists, close to social democracy. The withdrawal from UDF of BANU "Nikola Petkov" (with Milan Drenchev) in 1991 also weakened the positions of the left-wing and left-centrist parties in the coalition. The agrarians remaining in the Union defined themselves as right centre. On the whole, after the first wave of splits and party differentiation in 1991-1992, UDF found itself shifting rightwards, towards the liberal axis. This at first seemed perfectly logical, since UDF identified itself as the antipode to the leftist BSP.

In the beginning it seemed that most parties from UDF were seeking a liberal identity. This was also related to the liberal self-identification of a number of intellectuals who used to occupy leading positions in UDF in the early years. Liberals remained the most influential wing in UDF up to 1993, all the more that then President Zhelju Zhelev was an individual member of the Liberal International. The wave of conflicts between then President Zhelju Zhelev and UDF, and the subsequent new splits in the Union in 1992-1993 weakened the positions of liberals in the coalition. Practically, by 1995-1996 very few of the initial liberal formations remained in UDF, which once again shifted the Union ideologically and politically to the right, towards the axis of the christian-democrats and the conservatives.

Already within the frames of UDF, the Democratic Party (DP) and the United Christian-Democratic Centre (UCDC) turned towards partners from the European right. In 1992 they were affiliated as associate members and in 1995 full members of the European Christian-

Democratic Union (ECDU), which in October 1996 decided to merge with the European Popular Party, initially a parliamentary fraction of the Christian Democrats in the European Parliament. By 1995-1996, for a number of reasons, and especially after the Democrats left UDF, UCDC had gained decisive influence and political weight. This practically coincided with, and was possibly one of the reasons for the adoption of a Christian Democratic profile by UDF (Todorov 1999: 21-23).

This situation, in which UDF as a whole was not affiliated with any international party association, but specific parties from the Union were members of European unions, continued up to 1996 when the new leadership undertook steps to turn it into an integrated political party. At that time the tendencies of party differentiation, splits and alliances had led to a reduction of the share of left-wing and left-centrist political parties and organizations in the composition of UDF. So it seemed a quite logical development when in 1997-1998 UDF, already as a unified party, became affiliated with the European People's Party. The general process of establishment of the party structure in Bulgaria gradually shifted UDF rightwards, though it initially included influential left-wing parties. This ideological and political crystallization allowed European parties to "recognize" UDF as part of the right-wing and right-centrist powers.

On the other hand, the political genealogy of UDF relates it to influential American political parties and institutes in Bulgaria. With its emergence, UDF was defined in mass consciousness as the "Western party" legitimizing itself with the project of making Bulgaria part of the Western world, as opposed to "Eastern communism". From the very start the coalition received serious political, ideological, and material support from various foundations and associations from the U.S. Within UDF there have therefore always coexisted two parallel, and sometimes competing, lines of international legitimization – the European, and the American one. There is hardly any real "tension" between these two sources of international identification of UDF. Yet it is possible to speak of two competing strategies which sometimes divide the Union on matters on which EU and the U.S. take different stands. But with the inclusion in the structures of European parties, UDF has definitely come to adopt a more European strategy, without in any way distancing itself from American support.

The left (BSP) and the right (UDF) organized the whole political debate until 2001, both parties took more than the half of the total votes on every election of this period.

The confusion of the features of the major political parties characterizes the transition as a whole. This has several implications with immediate bearing on the international legitimization of Bulgarian political parties, which on the whole lagged behind as compared to other Central-European countries:

- the large parties, such as BSP and UDF claimed to represent the entire society, the whole palette of political values and strategies;
- the bi-party confrontation for a long time proceeded along Manichean lines, as exclusion of the other, rather than relative sharing of the political space;
- the indeterminacy (ideological, political, social) of the political parties all too often reduced the ideological and political differences to personal and moral ones, which impeded enduring inter-party associations and ultimately, the consolidation of the party system.

It is only in 1998-2000 that the process of differentiation and stabilization of the political space in this country started unfolding according to the "classical" scheme. Ten years after "the fall of the wall" did such political powers emerge which, rather than play a merely symbolic role ("new" and "old"), self-identify themselves as representing specific group interests. This process is ongoing and its visible results can be found both in the ideological refining of the major political actors, as well as in the emergence of political actors who typically define themselves as the "centre" and reproduce a "classical" political palette from the green left and social democracy to centrist liberalism and moderate conservatism. (Cf. Todorov 1997)

3. Endspiel: towards European standards.

There is an important question: what "European standards" mean in the party system? In the Bulgarian case "European standards" mean: adoption of the dominant models of party organization, adoption of the dominant differentiation of the party families in EU (mainly the political

groups in the European parliament, which serve as model of political palette) – almost the three main groups: EPP, PES and European liberals. If UDF is affiliated with the PPE and the BSP – with PES, there were not parliamentary or governmental parties in Bulgaria before 2001, affiliated with the European liberals.

The 2001 parliamentary elections changed a lot the political landscape in Bulgaria. The return of the former king Simeon II, the fast creation of its political National Movement Simeon II (NMSII) and its victory in 2001 could be seen as an emergence of the liberal centre in the Bulgarian political life. There were, it must be said, many explanation of this phenomenon. For many observers the return of the king was an attempt to destroy the party system and to replace it by a plebiscitary democracy without influential political parties, based on the direct contact between the charismatic leader and the people. This was mainly the explanation, shared by the right wing politicians. For another part of the observers, the return of the king was the breaking of the bi-polar mould and the end of the opposition between ex-communists and anti-communists. This puts in fact end to the political transition and opens new political debate, free of references on communism. This explanation was shared mostly by leftist politicians. At the end, there is a third explanation of the return of the king – the necessity to put the end of the political confrontation in order to replace it by a consensual democracy and national reconciliation. This explanation is shared by liberal politicians (Todorov 2001,2)

The NMSII represents in fact a new liberal centre in Bulgarian politics. It won the 2001 parliamentary elections and did one unexpected and extraordinary step – proposed governmental coalition to the Movement for rights and freedoms (MRF), the party, representing the Turkish and the Muslim minorities in Bulgaria, for all these years of transition being outside of the national power. This coalition was recognized by the European partners of MNSII and MRF, and both parties were affiliated to the European liberals.

The victory of the MNSII in 2001 puts both political protagonists of the transition – the BSP and the UDF into opposition – a situation without precedent. This produced different kind of evolution to the left and to the right.

On the left side the BSP undertook after 2001 a fast acquisition of a western profile, the process being started in 1998-1999, but reinforced and stimulated after the election of the socialist leader G. Parvanov in the presidency in 2001. In 2002 this evolution was recognized by the westerns partners of the BSP and the party became full member of the Socialist international. Within the left BSP acquired dominant position and viewed the disappearance of important challengers in the left field. The party “Bulgarian social-democracy” (former Euroleft) practically disappeared during 2001 and 2005 elections. The small communist parties still remained neo-Stalinist. There is a lack of influential extreme-left parties. In 2005 the BSP won the parliamentary elections, but did not have the majority, that implied the formation of socialist-liberal coalition with the MRF and the NMSII. This new coalition is the coalition of the political reconciliation and introduced a kind of “Belgium model” of consensual democracy. The presidential elections of October 2006 were won by the candidate of the left G.Parvanov, supported by the MRF and largely, but not officially, by the NMSII. This consolidated the tri-party coalition.

On the right side new splits occurred: the former UDF prime-minister I. Kostov left the party and established its own party – Democrats for strong Bulgaria (DSB), as well as the former mayor of the capital city Sofia – St.Sofiansky formed its own party after leaving the UDF. UDF changed its leader, electing the former president P. Stoyanov. All these transformations put big difficulties before the idea of the re-unification of the right – political strategy, claimed by many rightist leaders in order to reach common candidate for the presidential elections in 2006. Despite the different visions of the leaders of the right concerning the profile and the programme of the common candidate, N.Beronov, former constitutional judge was presented as a candidate of the right. But he arrived on the third position during the first round, which incited real crisis within the political right.

The crisis of the right was one of the main reasons for the appearance of the new populist far right – the party “Ataka”. The splits within the right were not, of course, the only one reason for this phenomenon. “The frustrated voters”, who could not find a political alternative of the statu quo during the last 5 years, motivated also by the growth of the Euro scepticism and moved about by the will to “oppose the consensus” and “to stop the abuses of MRF” – all these reasons motivated the vote for “Ataka”. This party shares largely xenophobe and even racist ideas, but this is not the ideology of each of its supporters. Among the reasons for the appear-

ance of this party some observers count the evolution of the MRF from civil-rights movement and political party for minority rights into clientelist circle deserving the interests of its leaders. The "Ataka" party uses populist rhetoric, which opposes the people as a whole, undifferentiated and unified, to the corrupted political class. Its representative in the European parliament joined the group of Jean-Marie le Pen, the French ultra-nationalist. The presidential candidate of "Ataka" arrived second in the elections of October 2006 and shook the whole party system.

One possible conclusion.

When analysing the evolution of the party system in post-communist Bulgaria one can ask if the classical political cleavages are of some importance for the process, or they are completely outdated. Are there new cleavages which explain the party formation and how long the opposition between anti-communists and ex-communists was or is still existent? Will Bulgaria reach a Belgium consensual style of democracy or will return to the bi-polar model? Will the BSP keep its dominant position within the left? Will the NMSII occupy the right space or will it stand in the centre? What will happen with the right in Bulgaria in the close future, will UDF survive or will be absorbed by the DSB?

Annexes:

Table: Parliamentary elections 1990-2005

| 1990 | Total number ^a | % | Seats | % |
|---------------------|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Registered voters | 6,990,435 | — | | |
| Votes cast | 6,333,334 | 90.6 | | |
| Invalid votes | 212,136 | 3.3 | | |
| Valid votes | 6,121,198 | 100.0 | | |
| | | | 400* | 100.0 |
| BSP | 2,886,363 | 47.2 | 211 | 52.8 |
| SDS | 2,216,127 | 36.2 | 144 | 36.0 |
| BZNS | 491,597 | 8.0 | 16 | 4.0 |
| DPS | 368,929 | 6.0 | 24 | 5.8 |
| OPT | 36,668 | 0.6 | 2 | 0.5 |
| Others ^a | 121,514 | 1.9 | 3 | 0.8 |

^a These are the figures only for the PR. There is no data for the second round of the majority system.

^b Others include 21 small parties. Among them: Alternative socialist party (ASP), Alternative socialist union (ASO), Era-3, Parliamentary movement for Turnovo constitution.

| Year | 1991 | | 1994 | |
|--------------------------|--------------|------|--------------|------|
| | Total number | % | Total number | % |
| Registered voters | 6,790,188 | — | 6,987,645 | — |
| Votes cast | 5,694,828 | 83.5 | 5,264,448 | 75.2 |
| Invalid votes | 153,921 | 2.3 | 62,354 | 1.2 |
| Valid votes | 5,540,907 | 97.7 | 5,202,094 | 98.8 |
| SDS | 1,903,569 | 34.4 | 1,254,465 | 24.1 |
| BSP | 1,836,050 | 33.1 | 2,258,212 | 43.4 |
| DPS | 418,341 | 7.6 | 282,711 | 5.4 |
| BZNS-united ^a | 214,031 | 3.9 | — | — |
| BZNS-NP | 190,446 | 3.4 | — | — |
| SDS-tz | 177,295 | 3.2 | — | — |
| SDS-l | 155,903 | 2.8 | — | — |
| BBB | 73,379 | 1.3 | 245,951 | 4.7 |
| NS | — | — | 338,427 | 6.5 |
| DAR | — | — | 196,995 | 3.8 |
| Others ^b | 571,893 | 10.3 | 625,333 | 12.0 |

^a BZNS-united appeared as an attempt to unite several agrarian unions.

^b Others include 28 small parties in 1991, and 38 small parties in 1994.

| Year | 1997 | | 2001 | |
|------------------------------|--------------|------|--------------|------|
| | Total number | % | Total number | % |
| Registered voters | 6,819,511 | – | 6,874,668 | – |
| Votes cast | 4,291,257 | 62.2 | 4,608,135 | 66.6 |
| Invalid votes | 35,956 | 0.8 | 39,944 | 0.9 |
| Valid votes | 4,255,301 | 99.2 | 4,568,191 | 99.1 |
| ODS | 2,223,714 | 52.3 | 830,338 | 18.2 |
| BSP | 939,308 | 22.1 | 783,372 | 17.1 |
| DPS | 323,429 | 7.6 | 340,395 | 7.5 |
| BEL | 234,058 | 5.5 | 44,975 | 1.0 |
| BBB | 209,796 | 4.9 | 17,341 | 0.4 |
| NDSV | – | – | 1,952,513 | 42.7 |
| George Day/VMRO ^a | – | – | 165,981 | 3.6 |
| Others ^b | 324,996 | 7.6 | 433,276 | 9.5 |

^a In 1997 the VMRO participated as part of the ODS alliance and from 2001 on it formed a coalition with the George Day party.

^b Others include 32 small parties in 1997, and 46 small parties in 2001.

| Year | 2005 | |
|--------------------------|--------------|------|
| | Total number | % |
| Registered voters | 6,778,080 | – |
| Votes cast | 3,747,822 | 55.3 |
| Invalid votes | 99,630 | 2.7 |
| Valid votes | 3,648,192 | 97.3 |
| BSP | 1,129,196 | 31.0 |
| NDSV | 725,314 | 19.9 |
| DPS | 467,400 | 12.8 |
| Ataka | 296,848 | 8.1 |
| ODS | 280,323 | 7.7 |
| DSB | 234,788 | 6.4 |
| BNS (SSD, BZNS/NS, VMRO) | 189,268 | 5.2 |
| NV | 107,758 | 3.0 |
| BSD ^a | 47,298 | 1.3 |
| Others ^b | 169,999 | 4.7 |

^a BSD led the Coalition of the rose with OBT and NDPS (Independent DPS).

^b Others include 12 small parties (among them: Dvizhenie “Napred Bgaria” and PD “Evromoma”) and 13 independent candidates.

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